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A postwar sexual liberation?
The gendered experience of the Soviet Union’s Great Patriotic War
Une libération sexuelle de l’après-guerre ?. La Grande Guerre patriotique et
l’évolution des rapports de genre en Union soviétique
Mie Nakachi
1 Igor´  Kon,  the  foremost  Russian  sexologist,  characterized  Stalin’s  sexual  politics  as
“consistently  repressive,  based  on  suppression  and  negation  of  sex  (osnovannoi  na
podavlenii i otritsanii seksa).” Kon recognizes that the Great Patriotic War had a significant
influence on family relations, sexual morality, and subsequent demographic changes. In
his view, the July 8, 1944 Family Law attempted to suppress wartime influence on sexual
behaviors and strengthen the family by making divorce even more difficult than the 1936
Family  Law had  stipulated,  while  depriving  out-of-wedlock  children  of  various  legal
rights, such as inheritance.1 This paper attempts to elaborate on Kon’s point about war’s
significant influence on family relations and sexual mores. In doing so, it reaches a new
conclusion:  postwar  Stalinist  sexual  politics  did  not  suppress,  but  encouraged  the
continuation of sexual behaviors that developed during the war.
2 In a comparative context, this development of Soviet sexual politics in the postwar period
helps us better understand the different trajectories of sexual revolution in the Soviet
Union and “the West.” In his study of the role of American and British women during
World War Two, John Costello vividly described and dissected the ways in which families
were broken-up by mobilization, the rise in temporary sexual relationships,  and how
women’s  expanded  roles  outside  the  home  during  the  war  had  a  great  impact  on
changing sexual desires and postwar norms. This wartime transformation destabilized
the family,  making divorce,  illegitimacy,  and venereal  disease  much more prevalent.
Costello also demonstrates that after the war was over, political, economic, cultural and
religious forces supported demobilized men’s wish to get their jobs back from women and
to have their wives waiting for them at home. Women were pushed back into traditional
family roles in order to restore the gender order of the prewar period, resulting in the
postwar baby boom. Divorce and illegitimate births were condemned again. The suburban
home, equipped with electric appliances, one or two cars, and several children, became
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the model  of  American life,  and the symbolic global vision of  the postwar wealth of
America.
3 In  the  West,  the  wartime  legacy  of  looser  sexual  attitudes  and women’s  economic
independence did not end here. In the late 1960s, women began to question whether they
had indeed been living “in a dream” and remembered about the excitement, materially
difficult, but emotionally fulfilling time they had had as workers and military volunteers
during the war. They were bitter about the fact that they were pushed back into the
home, without being given a choice of staying at the job they had became good at. Was
real  happiness  only  to  be  found  at  home  raising  children  and  taking  care  of  one’s
husband? This realization is said to have triggered the women’s liberation movement and
sexual revolution in the West in the 1960s.2 In this way, the wartime experience of work
and sexual liberation became a source of empowerment for women in the long-run.
4 Although Soviet women also worked in the military and industry,  and experienced a
looser sexual atmosphere during the war, these experiences did not lead to a women’s
liberation movement  later  on.  For  the  female  workforce,  the  war  years  were  not  as
transformative in the Soviet Union as in the West. In 1940, 39% of the Soviet labor force
was already female.  It  grew to 56% in 1945 and was reduced to 47% by 1950.3 Thus,
working outside the home during the war was not the same kind of novel experience for
Soviet women as it was for British and American women, because many were already
working in the prewar period and many remained in the workforce after the war. Because
so many men never came back from the fighting or came back crippled, Soviet women
remained in the workforce to make a living and support their families. Unlike the British
and American government, the Soviet government needed to keep the female workforce
for postwar reconstruction. As a result, Soviet women were more likely to be forced to
remain in the workforce than to be forced out of it. By 1970 when women in the West
were calling for women’s liberation from the home, over 50% of the Soviet labor force was
already female.4
5 If  labor was not a transformative factor,  what did wartime sexual liberation bring to
Soviet  women in the postwar period? In order to examine this  question,  this  article
analyzes various ways in which romantic or sexual relationships between women and
men  evolved  during  the  war,  producing  at  the  end  of  the  war  entirely  different
partnerships from those imagined at the time of separation. First I discuss the enormous
demographic transformation and the types of new sexual practice that developed during
the war. The Soviet Union’s total mobilization, more total than in most other countries,
affected nearly all families. Evacuations and deportations also shifted population across
the vast territory affected by the conflict. Despite many men and women wishing until
the end to be reunited after  the war,  deaths,  the prolonged separation and wartime
liaisons often resulted in broken marriages. This involved not only Soviet citizens, but
also relationships with the enemy in the occupied areas. No demographic shifts on this
scale had happened in the US since the American Civil War. As Soviet men and women
fought, worked, and lived in extreme conditions often away from families, temporary
sexual relationships developed, which transcended sexual norms in the prewar period.5
Considering the scale of Soviet demographic change and mobilization, the thoroughness
of sexual transformation, as measured by what percentage of the population was directly
affected by the war, the level would be higher in the Soviet Union than the United States.
Second, I describe the newly promulgated 1944 Family Law and its immediate effects on
the decisions women and men made about sex, marriage and family toward the end of the
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war. The wartime development of demography and sexual practice produced different
and often conflicting interests for women and men. I will argue that far from reimposing
traditional sexual values, the Soviet government actually promoted the continuation of
wartime sexual practice in the postwar period.
6 In the early Soviet period, Alexandra Kollontai’s “free love” and “withering away” of the
family were key theoretical views on communist sex and family. Previous studies of sex
and family in the Soviet Union tended to focus on how actual Soviet sexual practice and
policy were not as liberal as Kollontai’s theory would have suggested.6 However, this does
not mean that Soviet policy always promoted conservative sexual norms, such as sex
within legal  marriage.  After years of  wars and revolutions,  revolutionary family laws
made divorce easy to get, made legitimate and illegitimate children equal, and legalized
abortion. These changes were intended to modernize the family and improve women’s
status in marriage. However, women complained that their husbands took advantage of
revolutionary laws, had extramarital relationships, and got divorced often without taking
responsibility for their families.7 Stalin’s 1936 Family Law tried to discipline such paternal
behaviors,  making  divorce  difficult  and  increasing  fathers’  responsibility  for  child
support.8 However,  this  disciplining of  male sexuality  was short-lived because of  the
mobilization for the war.9 When another, more devastating war killed 27 million citizens,
the Soviet government, mainly concerned with the demographics, reversed the prewar
policy and encouraged sexual promiscuity, in a way Kollontai could never have imagined.
 
Departure
7 On  June  22,  1941,  German  attack,  the  infamous  Barbarossa,  triggered  Soviet  mass
mobilization to and evacuation away from the front. Up to 1945, 34 million men and 0.6
million women underwent mobilization. These women were often employed in positions
involving military administration, sanitation, and medical services and many went for
some training first,  so few left  for the front immediately,  waiting out the first,  most
brutal months of the war, when the German advance seemed almost unstoppable and
going to the front could easily mean being over-run and captured or cut  off  behind
German lines. Nevertheless, later most were relocated to the front, military bases, and
production units, leaving their families behind.10 The process of family break-up was also
accelerated by evacuation. Those who lived close to the western border of the Soviet
Union were evacuated to Siberia, the Caucasus and Central Asia, totaling approximately
16.5 million.11 In German-occupied areas, civilians were sorted and killed, most notably
and completely, over two million Jews, the first step towards Hitler’s final solution. Other
able  bodies,  both women and men,  were taken for  labor.  In the midst  of  such huge
demographic shifts, all numbered in the millions, many millions of families lost touch
with each other.
8 Separated family members expressed their desire to meet again when the war was over.
All desired return to earlier, better times, whether mobilized, evacuated, or deported, and
departing soldiers had an almost existentially strong desire for their family members to
wait for them to come back. Many of them were leaving for the front believing that their
aim was to protect those whom they loved from the enemy, and in fact, the enemy’s
brutal behavior in occupied areas would prove this thesis to be correct. Soldiers brought
photos of family members with them. They wrote letters to their parents, wives, lovers,
and  children  to  inform  them  that  they  were  alive.  “Wait  for  me,”  was  the  strong
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sentiment  shared  by  many  mobilized  soldiers,  which  crystallized  in  a  very  popular
wartime poem with that  title  authored by Konstantin Simonov.  This  poem created a
powerful image as the very act of waiting became a lifeline to survival for male soldiers,
in particular.12
…Let my mother and my son
Believe that I have died,
Let my friends, grown weary
Sit by the fireside
And drink the bitter wine
To my memory…
He who did not wait for me
Let him say ‘twas luck…
Why I survived
Only you and I will know
Simply, you knew how to wait
As no other knew.
9 Simonov’s vision inspired deep feelings of loyalty in many readers, no doubt, but the
realities of life during the war and into the postwar were something else.
10 Most people attempted to wait for their partners. However, waiting for someone without
knowing whether or when he would come back was often very difficult, particularly since
correspondence  was  irregular.  The  prolonged  separation  and  extreme  wartime
experiences changed both men and women physically and emotionally, creating a fear
that mutual attraction might have already disappeared. E. Sakharova, a Moscow doctor,
who was waiting for her mobilized husband Sergo, wrote in June 1942 in her diary, “[…] If
Sergo saw me now,  he would not  know me — so greatly have I  changed.”13 In such




11 The promise between lovers, married or not, to wait for each other would have been
strong  at  separation,  but  wartime  conditions  made  it  difficult  for  many  to  wait  for
someone who might not come back, or come back greatly changed. Wartime society, both
military and civilian, was filled with dislocated people and offered optimal conditions for
new  sexual  unions.  Among  civilians,  women  who  were  separated  from  lovers  and
husbands  sometimes  were  united  with  men  who  were  not  drafted.  “Masha  […]  had
stopped  writing  to  her  husband  and  had  taken  up  with  a  lame  musician,”  writes
Ehrenburg.14
12 This theme was common in artistic representations of wartime relationships. In “Nastia,”
a story about the Leningrad siege written by Vera Ketlinskaia in 1945, the hero Pavel,
remains in Leningrad, when his wife and children are evacuated, and has an affair with
his colleague Nastia.15 This representation survived long after the postwar period. The
internationally-popular 1957 movie, “The Cranes are Flying,” also draws on this theme.
Here the heroine marries her lover’s brother, who escaped mobilization by bribery.16 A
1959 film “Ballad of a Soldier” depicts a scene where Aleksei finds out during his six-day
vacation from the front that the wife of a soldier who asked him to deliver a gift of soap
to her,  was living with another man.17 Also in the 2000 novel Kazus Kukotskogo,  Elena
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Georgievna, the heroine “marries” Pavel Alekseevich Kukotskii, the main character, the
surgeon  who  operated  on  her  to  remove  her  cancerous  reproductive  organs  during
evacuation, while her husband was fighting at the front. Later, she learns that he died on
the very day on which she first had sex with Dr. Kukotskii, the hero. “Oh my God! How
can I continue alive?” the heroine cries as she reads the date of death.18
13 In both the Soviet Army and Navy enlisted women were mainly in their late teens and
early twenties, so a significant number of sexual unions and “marriages” were formed.
Under extreme conditions at the front, young women surrounded by men often fell in
love with male soldiers.19 In the military, being a woman among many men who lived
every single day as possibly the last day of their lives and sought to have some warmth,
meant that she encountered many sexual advances. In order to protect themselves, many
girls tried to have one partner.20
14 When mutual, such attractions quickly metamorphosed into unions, often casually, but
almost  universally  described  as  “marriage  (brak).”21 Happy  marriages  were  brief  in
duration,  often broken by death.  But  some endured.  Svetlana N.  Liubich,  who was a
sanitation officer (sandruzhinnitsa) in WWII knew a battalion commander and a nurse who
fell in love with each other and “got married.” The commander was severely wounded in
a battle and taken to a hospital in the rear. The nurse, who was pregnant, was left behind.
The commander wrote to her to go to his parents and give birth to his son or daughter,
showing his loyal intentions, should he return.22 E.A. Iasinskaia, who voluntarily joined
the army and served in communications (voisk sviazi) met her future husband in 1943 and
registered marriage in 1946 after both of them were demobilized.23
15 Other  unions  in  the  military  were  more  hierarchical  in  nature  and  typically  mated
officers  with  female  soldiers  or  medical  personnel.  Often,  the  women  in  such
relationships took care of the officers’ sexual and other daily needs, such as washing and
cleaning. Such relationships, in time, began to be considered as a kind of “marriage.” The
women involved were dubbed “field campaign wives (polevaia peredvizhnaia zhena, or PPZh
),” especially by the rank and file soldiers. In return for their service to a male officer,
PPZh were privileged in their living conditions,  getting better access to supplies and
transportation while other women went on foot.24 On rare occasions, PPZh acquired the
powers of their consorts and were labeled “autocratic queens (samoderzhavnaia koroleva).”
Many  got  pregnant,  since  condoms  were  almost  unavailable.  Most  chose  to  abort.25
Discovery of an abortion attempt would, however, be cause for discharge.26
16 Civilian women and military men also “hooked up.” Venereal disease records show that
Soviet  military  men visited women during business  trips,  leaves  of  absence,  and re-
deployments.  When possible,  they visited families,  but also women who lived nearby.
Within the military, the most mobile personnel, such as drivers and those responsible for
material  procurement,  tended to have excellent social  opportunities.  These behaviors
were recorded by venereologists who were concerned with the growing rate of venereal
disease  in  military  and  civilian  population  alike,  since  late  1943.  VD  reached  such
proportions  that  those  on leave or  official  travel  were  required to  obtain and carry
certificates guaranteeing their disease-free status.27
17 Female medical personnel also came into contact with on-duty or medically-discharged.
Both those who were recovering and those who were dying had their charms. Healthier
officers and soldiers also sometimes checked themselves out of hospital to visit nearby
towns or villages. A March 1944 report from the military medical administration (glavnoe
voenno-sanitarno e upravlenie) to the Central Committee described drinking bouts, street-
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fighting  and  VD  infection  during  such  unregulated  escapes.  Clearly,  casual  sexual
relationships were also involved.28 Even worse, the upper-echelons of military medicine
were  increasingly  convinced  that  their  soldiers  were  becoming  the  major  vector  of
syphilis  in  the  general  population.29 In  sum,  officers  and  their  men  infected  and
impregnated civilian women on their way to, from, and during hospitalization.
18 Sexual violence occurred particularly when soldiers crossed borders. In German-occupied
areas, some local women were raped by German soldiers. To offset this,  the Germans
created military brothels, where local women were made available on demand, in order
to satisfy soldiers’ sexual needs in an orderly manner. In Gatchina, a Leningrad suburb,
approximately 2,000 women were housed in an “isolation house (izoliatsionnyi dom)” for
sexual slavery.30 In Ukraine younger women between ages thirteen and sixteen reportedly
worked in officers’ brothels. Not only Germans, but also the Hungarian, Romanian, and,
finally, Soviet armies raped women in Ukraine.31
19 In the occupied area, a fair amount of fraternization took place between German men and
Ukrainian women who sought a German partner on the street in the hope of getting
material help and protection.32 Erenburg quickly felt the complexities, when the woman
whose house he was billeted in briefly asked his help to trace a missing husband. He asked
her how the Germans had behaved and she said that “No German ever set foot in here,”
only to be contradicted by her little son, “Mama, Uncle Otto used to come every day, he
played with me, he played with you too.” The side-product of this wide range of more or
less  coerced  relations  and  deteriorated  health  services  was  high  VD  infection  and
abortion  rates  in  German-occupied  areas.  Venereologists and  doctors  in  women’s
medicine understood these special conditions. These sexual relationships with the enemy
would have consequences for postwar marriage and divorce.
20 In 1944 and 1945, Stalin received information about Soviet soldiers’ rape cases in Ukraine,
Latvia, and Belarus.33 However, he did not take strong disciplinary measures in the army,
allowing more mass rapes to occur. When the Red Army reached Berlin, soldiers raped
women left and right, German, Jewish, young and old.34 For the same years and after,
Norman Naimark’s  work has clarified how the Soviet  military in Eastern Europe and
Germany plundered civilian homes and conducted mass rape often in brutal, even fatal,
forms. The young Alexander Solzhenitsyn, taking part in the German campaign wrote the
following verses:
Zweiundzwanzig, Horingstrasse
It’s not been burned, just looted, rifled.
A moaning, by the walls half muffled:
The mother’s wounded, still alive.
The little daughter’s on the mattress,
Dead. How many have been on it
A platoon, a company perhaps?
A girl’s been turned into a woman.
A woman turned into a corpse…35
21 Rape would remain a problem in Germany and elsewhere until 1947, when Soviet soldiers
were confined to camp. A clear anti-rape position would not be formulated and enforced
within the Soviet Union until 1949.36
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Reproductive Consequences of Wartime Sexual
Behavior and Postwar Policy
22 While  both  women  and  men  experienced  various  types  of  non-conjugal  sexual
relationships during the war, the kinds of consequences they faced were deeply gendered.
37 Several elements separated women’s and men’s consequences of wartime relationship.
First, men were more likely to die in time of war, and women were more likely to be left
without partners. The sex-imbalance among the adult population made it easier for men
to  find  sexual  partners  than  women.38 Second,  women  faced  such  reproductive
consequences as pregnancy, abortion, and miscarriages as a result of sexual relationships.
Due to the criminalization of abortion since 1936, finding a safe underground operation
was  very  difficult,  and  wartime  material  deprivation  often  made  pregnancy
uncomfortable and difficult to carry to term.39 Third, women were far more likely to be
socially condemned for wartime sexual  liaisons than men in the postwar period.  For
example,  women  from  the  front  were  often  considered  sexually  promiscuous  and
therefore undesirable brides  after  demobilization.  After  the war,  demobilized women
often felt compelled to hide the fact that they had served in the army and did not wear
medals because the reputation of female soldiers as a group was tainted.40 This contrasted
with demobilized male soldiers whose sexual practices were generally not questioned. In
the 1980s Nina V. Il´inskaia, who served in the war as a nurse, lamented:
A man returns and he’s a hero. A [potential] bridegroom! But if a girl returns, then
she is immediately looked upon askance (kosoi vzgliad) as if to say, “We know what
you did there…” And the whole family wonders, “Why marry her?,” To be honest,
we covered it up and didn’t want to say that we had been at the front. We wanted to
become normal girls again. [Potential] brides.41
23 The fact that women suffered more than men from the reproductive consequences of
wartime  sexual  encounters  was  unavoidable,  given  not  only  women’s  reproductive
functions,  but  also  wartime  demographic,  social,  cultural,  and  emotional  conditions.
Nevertheless, it would be a serious oversight to consider the war as the only major cause
of postwar Soviet women’s difficulties. The 1944 Family Law in particular created a more
disadvantageous  position  for  women  than  otherwise,  while  releasing  men  from  the
responsibilities of fathering out-of-wedlock children.
24 The  1944  Family  Law  was  a  pronatalist  policy  recommended  and  drafted  by  N.S.
Khrushchev, the boss of Ukraine, as a response to wartime losses, the scale of which was
not revealed to the Soviet public during Stalin’s lifetime. After passing under Molotov’s
and Stalin’s editorial eye, the draft was promulgated as all-Union Law on July 8, 1944.
Given  the  extremely  unbalanced  sex  ratio,  Khrushchev  thought  that  accelerated
population growth would be possible only if men were given incentive to impregnate
women  other  than  their  wives,  and  if  unmarried  and  widowed  women  were  given
sufficient support to raise out-of-wedlock children.  Despite this  spirit  of  encouraging
extramarital sexual affairs, and the general state of marriages in flux, the law made it
harder  to  get  a  divorce.  Moreover,  for  highly  fertile  women,  significantly  increased
financial support would be provided. As for single mothers, new aid would be provided at
the same monetary level as the prewar child support payment.
25 For men the necessary incentive was identified as a release from financial responsibility
for their post-1944 out-of-wedlock children. In order to release men from financial and
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legal  responsibilities,  the new law recognized only registered marriage,  moving away
from the revolutionary family law which recognized common-law marriages. Mothers not
in registered marriages were now considered “unmarried” mothers under the law, and
could no longer register the child under the name of the biological father. Instead, single
mothers could pick a patronymic for the child, while the line for the “father” on the birth
certificates would be left blank or marked with a dash.42
26 This  pronatalist  policy  with the explicit  intention to encourage the births  of  out-of-
wedlock  children  might  have  been  able  to  help  postwar  “unmarried”  mothers,  if  it
provided sufficient financial and material support for them, and if unmarried mothers
and  fatherless  children  became  socially  and  culturally  accepted.  However,  neither
happened. With regard to the amount of child support, in the final law it was lowered
from  the  level  initially  proposed  by  Khrushchev’s  draft.  In  this  way,  unmarried
motherhood  would  become  associated  with  poverty.  Khrushchev’s  draft  proposed  to
include a propaganda effort  for normalizing unmarried motherhood,  however,  to my
knowledge, this never became a part of the policy. Although unmarried postwar mothers
may  not  have  been  openly  discriminated  against,  particularly  because  it  was  often
difficult  to  distinguish  them  from  postwar  widows  with  children,  it  is  clear  that
unmarried mothers considered it a plight for children not to have the name of the father
on their birth certificates.43 Because pronatalist policy made it more advantageous for
women to be in registered marriage than to be unmarried mothers,  postwar women
aspired to be in legal marriage.
27 By the time the law was promulgated, it was already becoming important for women to
obtain legal marital status with their prewar and wartime partners, because wives of dead
or missing soldiers received various forms of state aid and pension as long as they did not
remarry.  Already  on  April  28,  1943,  Sovnarkom  SSSR  issued  a  decree  (postanovlenie)
providing  lump  sum  payments  to  the  wives  of  general  and  high-ranking  officers  (
nachsostav) of the Red Army who were missing or dead in the war. The amount of the aid
was  substantial:  up  to  100,000  rubles.44 Around the  same time,  the  government  also
provided lump sums or pensions for wives and families of rank-and-file service men and
lower-ranking  officers.45 To  be  eligible  for  such  aid,  wives  had  to  provide  marriage
certificates and proof that they had not subsequently remarried.
28 Women who were already married in the prewar were also deeply affected by this law,
that made divorce difficult to get, but made it easy for men to have extramarital sexual
relationships. Some of them at least initially welcomed the law as they thought it was
protecting their marriage from their husbands’ wartime liaisons.46 However, the difficulty
of divorce did not stop their husbands from pursuing their desire to be with wartime or
postwar partners. Such a moment was depicted in the story “Nastia,” mentioned above,
when the hero Pavel tried to decide whether to go back to his wife and children or stay
with his wartime lover,  Nastia.47 During an oral interview with me, A. (born in 1929)
talked about  a  woman whose husband did not  want  to  be  with his  wife  after  being
demobilized from the war. “They had three children. She chased him in town, at work, in
the metro, but that didn’t do anything. He went to another woman, got married, and had
two children. He just didn’t want to live with her.”48
29 In  contrast  to  postwar  women who wanted to  obtain  or  maintain  the  state  of  legal
marriage,  many  men  wanted  to  get  a  divorce  or  be  relieved  from  child  support
responsibilities. Soon after the 1944 Law was introduced, legal experts noted that most
cases of divorce were filed by men in the military and white-collar male workers.49 In
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1944, in the city of Moscow, of 470 divorce cases, 386 were filed by men, and 84 by women.
In Moscow oblast,  of  50 divorce cases,  38 were filed by men,  and 12 by women. The
majority of those who filed for divorce were between 30 and 40 years old and had been
married for five to ten years.50 In Ukraine of 32 divorce cases, 25 were filed by men, and 7
by women. In the city of Leningrad, of 59 cases examined from September to December
1944, 51 were filed by men, and 8 by women.51
30 In a 1944 study of divorce by NKIu, the presence of another de facto family and infidelity
of the spouse were two of the three most common reasons for divorce in Russia and
Ukraine, the third one being family quarrels and dissimilarity of characters.52 In this way,
broken relationships under two labels, one called de facto marriage, the other, infidelity,
became the most common reason for divorce.
31 In the capitals, Moscow and Leningrad, the presence of another marriage was the most
common reason for divorce. In L´vov oblast, Moscow oblast, and the city of Sverdlovsk,
from 24 percent to 76 percent of  the cases were motivated by the desire to legalize
postwar families.53 Given the prevalence of wartime liaisons, this is not surprising. For
example, Comrade Shiriaev of Khar´kov filed for divorce in December 1944, because his
new “wife” would soon give birth. He wanted to “legalize” the new marriage to register
the child under his family name.54
32 For men, a wife’s infidelity, a wartime liaison, was another common reason for divorce.55
Condemnation was strongest when fraternization with the enemy was suspected. This
happened most commonly to couples who were from areas occupied during the war,
which probably explains why infidelity was higher on the list of reasons for divorce in
Ukraine  than  in  RSFSR.  When  infidelity  was  the  reason  for  male-initiated  divorce,
women’s wartime sexual behavior, such as fraternization with Germans, was condemned.
Captain I.M. Sukach wrote,
during the German occupation of Ukraine, my wife got married to a German militia
man in order to avoid labor deportation to Germany. She lived with him for a while,
that is, until the arrival of the Red Army. Then he was killed, and she was left alone.
I learned about this directly from her in the letters she wrote to me. She asks me to
accept her again. But because I was at the front for the whole time, and she got
married to a German lackey, I decided to break off all ties with her… Please explain
to me what I need to do so that my official documents do not include my wife, who
got married to a German lackey.56
33 As seen in Sukach’s letter, when demobilized male soldiers wanted a divorce due to their
wives’  infidelities,  they often expressed their  entitlement to divorce because of  their
military service in WWII.  This feeling was strongly expressed by I.T.  Avdeev,  a WWII
invalid. Avdeev wanted a divorce because when he went back to Osipenko in Zaporozhskii
oblast, which was under German occupation during the war, he found out that his wife
had lived with a “German fascist invader” until the German retreat. Avdeev emphasized
that he should be given a divorce because he had defended his country and his former
wife was a taint on his record which needed to be cleansed.
34 Avdeev expressed his indignation with his wife all the more strongly for his own desire to
legalize his wartime relationship — also adulterous. Avdeev had found a “true” Soviet
woman to marry. Strictly speaking, the fact that he had already found a woman to marry
before legalizing divorce could also be considered infidelity, but Avdeev self-righteously
presented his position as a hero entitled to special consideration:
At this time my wife is not in Osipenko and it is not clear where she is. Now I must
divorce her, because I found for myself a different wife, who is a real Soviet woman
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(polnost´iu  sovetskai  a  zhenshchina)  […]  If  my  former  wife  returned  to  Osipenko,
noone could force me to live with such a woman, who betrayed not only me, but
also  our  Fatherland  and  our  people  whom  I  defended.  I  was  decorated  for
destroying German fascist beasts, so if I live with this bitch (svoloch´) again, it will be
a shame and disgrace (pozor) for the people (narod) whom I freed and defended. I
ask  for  your  help  in  this  matter  so  that  I  can  purge  (ochistit´)  myself  and  my
document of such scum (nechist´). Also, I do not have the means to pay the legal
costs because my wife squandered everything while I was absent…57
35 In postwar Ukraine, this case was not unusual. NKIu Ukraine reported that according to
the analysis  of  cases between February and March 1945,  many military men initially
covered up the presence of the new family or intimate relations with other women (
blizkaia sviaz´ s drugimi zhenshchinami) and made up “irrelevant motives (nesushchestvennye
motivy)” instead. Citizen Dorogobuzhan, for example, filed in Khar´kov’s People’s court to
divorce his wife Evgeniia. They had two teen-age daughters. He reported the reason for
divorce as his wife’s adultery with German occupiers. However, during the court hearing
it was revealed that the plaintiff was living with another woman. The oblast court decided
not to grant the divorce.58
36 Other demobilized husbands wanted not only divorce, but also punishments for wives
who did not await the return of their husbands. For example, P.V. Grigor´ev asked for
gratis divorce as a Red Army soldier earning only 65 rubles per months. He also wanted to
know under what law his wife could be punished for infidelity.59 Other soldiers were
indignant at the possibility that unmarried women who conceived children by Germans
could be entitled to state aid provisions in the 1944 Family Law.60
37 As  husbands,  men  demanded  divorce,  arguing  that  wives’  infidelity,  and  their  own
patriotic service in the war entitled them to it, even if the biggest reason was formalizing
marriage with their wartime partners. As fathers, they also inquired about their child
support  obligations  under  the  new  law,  but  these  questions  were  often  inspired  by
diametrically opposed conceptions of personal interest. Men wanted to know the limits of
their new “freedom.” For example, I.I.  Garban´ (Ivanovo oblast) asked if he should be
paying support  for  the  children of  his  prewar  common-law marriage.  He  had three.
Already before he was mobilized into the army, he had separated from his wife and began
paying  25  percent  of  his  salary  as  child  support.  After  demobilization,  even  before
locating his family, he wanted to know the personal implications of the new law.61
38 In contrast, women, as mothers regardless of what the law said, felt that fathers should
take part in childrearing, at least financially. P.M. Nikitichna wrote to the editor of the
journal Working Woman (Rabotnitsa) after receiving no help from the court:
“Dear Comrades! Please put yourself in my shoes and advise me. I  am in a very
difficult  family  situation.  My husband,  Razuvaev Ivan Leont´evich,  with whom I
lived  eleven  years  together  in  one room  has  now  left  me  for  another  woman,
leaving  me  with  two  children  […]  The  father  categorically  refuses  to  help  his
children and said “You are not my legal wife. Our marriage was not registered. The
new law abolished child support, so I will not pay it. Go ahead. Sue me.” I contacted
People’s court in Pervomaiskii raion. My case was not accepted.62
 
Conclusion
39 Both  Soviet  women  and  men  transformed  their  understandings  of  family,  sex  and
marriage  in  a  state  of  war  that  brought  death  into  every  household  and,  from the
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perspective of those experiencing it, had no predetermined length or outcome, making
very real the possibility for many that their last days, weeks and months had arrived.
Under the extreme wartime conditions, Soviet men and women engaged in sex without
thinking about their prewar lives as wives and husbands. Men far away from their wives
engaged in extramarital sex with their female comrades in the military, local women
living  nearby,  and enemy women.  Women in  the  military,  at  the  home front,  or  in
occupied  areas  also  sometimes  had  similar  experiences,  because  they  also  needed
company in the face of death, together with material and/or emotional support during
the toughest period of so many peoples’ lives. In the rear, the news of death also came
often. Many sought comfort where they could find it.
40 After the war, in the US and Western Europe, the government and religious leaders tried
to restore prewar sexual mores and gender relations pushing women back into the home
and expecting  and encouraging demobilized soldiers  to  become responsible  workers,
husbands,  and fathers.  In  large  part  this  worked out,  as  the  postwar  middle  classes
adopted these roles and mores. The Soviet government did not choose this path. Toward
the end of the war, when Soviet victory became obvious, the 1944 Family Law offered
increased support for women and children on paper, but in practice was encouraging
citizens, particularly men, to continue to engage in sex, without thinking about the long-
term  consequences,  in  order  to  increase  the  birthrate.  With  contraception  virtually
unavailable, every sexual act carried with it high probability of pregnancy. Men would
not  be  held  responsible  for  the  reproductive,  social,  economic,  and cultural  costs  of
extramarital sex. And without men’s commitment to participate in the raising of their
own offspring, women were more likely than not to abort.63
41 When the war was coming to an end, men and women began thinking about relationships
and reproduction in longer terms, and many wanted to legalize ties developed during the
war. However, the 1944 Family Law created new problems for both men and women,
whose family lives had been torn apart by the war.  Many men were unable to get a
divorce due to the strict, time-consuming, and expensive procedures. Women could not
register their marriages because their new partners were married, or the partners were
not interested in registering a marriage. Nevertheless, this did not stop the men from
leaving their prewar legal or common-law wives to start living with the new partners.
42 Women accepted living as extra-legal wives often against their will,  because so many
husbands and future husbands had died in the war, becoming a wife and mother in a
traditional form of marriage became an unattainable perspective for millions of Soviet
women.64 Also,  since  the  law  made  it  easier  for  men  to  walk  away  from  childcare
responsibilities, they were more likely to take advantage of it. This official promotion of
irresponsible fatherhood, often created unhappy “unmarried” mothers who could not
register the marriage or register their children under the names of the biological father.
Fathers who left for a woman other than the wife were likely to stay with the new partner
with or without a divorce. Between 1945 and 1955 alone, new liaisons would produce 8.7
million out-of-wedlock children, and the average rate of out-of-wedlock births in the
rural and urban areas of the Soviet Union ranged between 15 and 20 percent of all births
in the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s. This meant that extramarital sex was very
common and tolerated, even if prejudice remained. Moreover, this practice was promoted
by the government. We may call this phenomenon a postwar sexual liberation, sponsored
by a government pronatalist policy.
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43 It has been argued, for the West, that the 1950s was the time when traditional sexual and
gender norms made a comeback. Women returned home, got married, and had babies.
For  Soviet  women,  it  was  otherwise.  The recovering economy needed them,  so  they
remained in the workforce. One out of every six children born in the Soviet Union was
officially born out-of-wedlock and additional millions grew up without fathers. In a social
environment  where  men all  had many prospects  for  sexual  relationships  and where
contraception was not available, becoming a single working mother was a real possibility,
but not a desirable prospect.65 In such a situation, finding a responsible partner for legal
marriage became a more urgent concern for women than liberating oneself from the
domesticity of family life.66 The trajectories of sexual liberation also differed between the
Soviet Union and the West. In the West, sexual liberation began as a grassroots reaction
to a decade of traditional sexual roles and norms. In the Soviet Union, it was implicitly
promoted by the government itself, against the will of women who often wanted stable
sexual and family relationships. Although Stalin was repressive in many respects, a wide-
range of sources attest that extramarital sex flourished after the war. The experience of
wartime sexual transformation and postwar pronatalist government intervention took
Soviet women down a different road from the path taken by their sisters in the US and
Britain.
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The  Soviet  Union’s  wartime  mobilization  and  evacuation  brought  about  unprecedented
demographic changes, tearing prewar families and marriages apart. This article analyzes how
romantic or sexual relationships between women and men evolved during the war, how they
affected  the  formation  of  postwar  marriages  and  family,  and  how  the  Soviet  government
attempted to influence this  process.  In postwar England and the United States,  political  and
religious leadership often condemned the sexual practices that developed during the war and
called for a return to traditional marriages where the husband, the breadwinner of the family,
would support a housewife and children. This paper argues that far from reimposing traditional
sexual  values,  the  Soviet  government  actually  promoted  the  continuation  of  wartime sexual
practice  in  the  postwar  period  due  to  its  overriding  pronatalist  concerns.  This  postwar
experience produced a different path to the women’s liberation movement for Soviet women
than for women in the West.
Résumé
En Union soviétique,  pendant la guerre,  la mobilisation et l’évacuation ont été à l’origine de
changements démographiques sans précédents, séparant les familles et brisant les mariages. Cet
article analyse l’évolution des rapports de genre pendant cette période, la répercussion de cette
évolution sur la vie familiale d’après-guerre, avec notamment la formation de nouveaux couples,
et les interventions du gouvernement soviétique. Dans l’après-guerre, en Angleterre et aux États-
Unis,  les dirigeants politiques et  religieux ont condamné les pratiques sexuelles qui  s’étaient
développées pendant la guerre. Ils ont appelé à un retour à l’union traditionnelle, au sein de
laquelle l’homme est le soutien de famille et pourvoit aux besoins de son épouse et de ses enfants.
En Union soviétique, le gouvernement n’a pas imposé ce retour aux traditions. Préoccupé par le
problème primordial de la natalité, il a encouragé les pratiques développées pendant la guerre,
ouvrant ainsi une voie au mouvement de libération des femmes soviétiques différente de celle
empruntée par les Occidentales.
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